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Value in Nature and the Nature of 
Value 
HOLMES ROLSTON I I I  
I offer myself as a nature guide, exploring for values. Many before 
us have got lost and we must look the world over. The unexam- 
ined life is not worth living; life in an unexamined world is not 
worthy living either. We miss too much of value. 
Valuable Humans 
Let us start from well-mapped ground: humans are able to value. 
Descartes's cogito is as well an indubitable valeo. I cannot doubt 
that I value. Humans are able to value nature instrumentally, to 
value their own experiential states both intrinsically and instru-
mentally. Objective natural things and events may contribute to 
these subjective interest satisfactions, a tree supplies firewood, a 
sunny day makes a picnic possible. 
Taking the first step on our journey into non-human nature, 
some travellers notice that we must take along this indubitable 
valuing self; afterwards, along the way, finding these selves always 
present, they deny any value outside our own minds. Wilhelm 
Windelband insists:  'Value . . .  is never found in the object itself as 
a property. It consists in a relation to an appreciating mind . . . .  
Take away will and feeling and there is no such thing as value' 
(Windelband, 1921, p. 215). Bryan Norton concludes: 'Moralists 
among environmental ethicists have erred in looking for a value in 
living things that is independent of human Valuing. They have 
therefore forgotten a most elementary point about valuing any-
thing. Valuing always occurs from the viewpoint of a conscious 
valuer . . . .  Only the humans are valuing agents' (Norton, 1991, p. 
251). 
Taking an interest in an object gives humans a value-ability. 
Additionally to valuing nature instrumentally, humans can some-
times value nature intrinsically. When we value a giant sequoia 
tree, our valuing stops in the tree itself, without further contribu-
tory reference. What then is going on? Philosophical travellers, 
after taking a look at the tree, will want to take a look at their lan-
guage. 'Intrinsic' means without instrumental reference, but that 
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leaves unsettled whether the value is located in the tree indepen-
dently, autonomously intrinsic, or placed on the tree upon our 
arrival. We cannot just take it as elementary that there is no such 
thing as non-human value. Is this intrinsic value discovered or 
conferred? There is excitement in the beholder; but what is valued 
is what is beheld. 
If the value-ability of humans is the source of this valued excite-
ment, then value is anthropogenic even though it is not anthro- 
pocentric (Callicott, 1984; 1986). Tourists in Yosemite do not 
value the sequoias as timber but as natural classics, for their age, 
strength, size, beauty, resilience and majesty. This viewing consti-
tutes the trees' value, which is not present independent of the 
human valuing. Value thus requires subjectivity to coagulate it in 
the world. But the value so coagulated, it will be claimed, is placed 
objectively on the tree. Such value is not self-regarding, or even 
human-regarding, merely, though it is human-generated. It is not 
centred on human well-being. That 'n is valuable' does mean that a 
human, H, takes an interest in n, a natural object, but it need not 
mean 'n satisfies H's desire', since H may take an interest in the 
trees for what they are in themselves, and not merely to satisfy H's 
desires. Meanwhile, there is no value until consciousness comes on 
scene. 
Visiting the Grand Canyon, we intrinsically value the rock strata 
with their colour bands. Visiting Kentucky, we value Mammoth 
Cave, with its stalactites. Taking any interest whatever constitutes 
value ipso facto. An otherwise valueless object can thus come to 
have intrinsic value. As travellers we will wonder what was here 
before, what will remain after. The obvious answer is that there 
will be whatever properties these trees, canyons, and caves have. 
Even Descartes found himself unable to doubt the existence of 
external nature, and no philosopher who doubts that the world 
exists bothers to take a trip through it. 
What account do we give when, excited by a sense of deep time 
at the Grand Canyon, we realize that humans have rarely been 
there? At that point, we may wish to give a dispositional twist to 
value. To say that n is valuable means that n is able to be valued, if 
and when human valuers, H's, come along, but n has these proper-
ties whether or not humans arrive. Faced with trilobite fossils, we 
conclude that the trilobites were potentially intrinsically valuable. 
By this account there is no actual value ownership autonomous to 
the valued and valuable trees, canyons, trilobites; there is a value 
ignition when humans arrive. Intrinsic value in the realized sense 
emerges relationally with the appearance of the subject-generator. 
Despite the language of value conferral, if we try to take the 
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term intrinsic seriously, this cannot refer to anything the object 
gains, to something within ('intra') the present tree or the past 
trilobite, for the human subject does not really place anything on 
or in the natural object. We have only a 'truncated sense' of intrin-
sic (Callicott, 1986, p. 143). The attributes under consideration are 
objectively there before humans come, but the attribution of value 
is subjective. The object causally affects the subject, who is excited 
by the incoming data and translates this as value, after which the 
object, the tree, appears as having value, rather like it appears to 
have green colour. But nothing is really added intrinsically; every-
thing in the object remains what it was before. Despite the lan-
guage that humans are the source of value which they locate in the 
natural object, no value is really located there at all. 
The term intrinsic, even when truncated, is misleading. What is 
meant is better specified by the term extrinsic, the ex indicating the 
external, anthropogenic ignition of the value, which is not in, 
intrinsic, internal to the nonsentient organism, even though this 
value, once generated, is apparently conferred on the organism. In 
the H-n encounter, value is conferred by H on n, and that is really 
an extrinsic value for n, since it comes to n from H, and likewise it 
is an extrinsic value for H, since it is conferred from H to n, 
Neither H nor n, standing alone, have such value. 
We humans carry the lamp that lights up value, although we 
require the fuel that nature provides. Actual value is an event in 
our consciousness, though natural items while still in the dark of 
value have potential intrinsic value. Man is the measure of things, 
said Protagoras. Humans are the measurers, the valuers of things, 
even when we measure what they are in themselves. 
Valuable Animals 
A mother free-tail bat, a mammal like ourselves, can, using sonar, 
wend her way out of Bracken Cave, in Texas, in total darkness, 
catch 500-1000 insects each hour on the wing, and return to find 
and nurse her own young. That gives evidence of bat-valuing; she 
values the insects and the pup. Now, it seems absurd to say that 
there are no valuers until humans arrive. Animals do not make 
humans the measure of things at all. There is no better evidence of 
non-human values and valuers than spontaneous wildlife, born 
free and on its own. Animals hunt and howl, find shelter, seek out 
their habitats and mates, care for their young, flee from threats, 
grow hungry, thirsty, hot, tired, excited, sleepy. They suffer 
injury and lick their wounds. Here we are quite convinced that 
value is non-anthropogenic, to say nothing of anthropocentric. 
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These wild animals defend their own lives because they have a 
good of their own. There is somebody there behind the fur or 
feathers. Our gaze is returned by an animal that itself has a con-
cerned outlook. Here is value right before our eyes, right behind 
those eyes. Animals are value-able, able to value things in their 
world. But we may still want to say that value exists only where a 
subject has an object of interest. David Prall writes: 'The being 
liked or disliked of the object is its value . . . . Some sort of a sub-
ject is always requisite to there being value at all (Prall, 1921, p. 
227). So at least the higher animals can value too, because they are 
experiencing subjects and can take an interest in things. 
Do animals value anything intrinsically? We may not think that 
animals have the capacity, earlier claimed for humans, of confer-
ring intrinsic value on anything else. Mostly they seek their own 
basic needs, food and shelter, and care for their young. But then 
why not say that an animal values its own life for what it is in 
itself, intrinsically, without further contributory reference? Else 
we have an animal world replete with instrumental values and 
devoid of intrinsic values, everything valuing the resources it 
needs, nothing valuing itself. That is implausible. Animals main-
tain a valued self-identity as they cope through the world. Valuing 
is intrinsic to animal life. 
Valuable Organisms 
Outdoors it is difficult to get out of sight of plants. It is also diffi-
cult for philosophers to 'see' plants philosophically. Few are 
botanists. Also, it is easy to overlook the insects. Even fewer 
philosophers are entomologists. 
A plant is not a subject, but neither is it an inanimate object, like 
a stone. Plants, quite alive, are unified entities of the botanical 
though not of the zoological kind, that is, they are not unitary 
organisms highly integrated with centred neural control, but they 
are modular organisms, with a meristem that can repeatedly and 
indefinitely produce new vegetative modules, additional stem 
nodes and leaves when there is available space and resources, as 
well as new reproductive modules, fruits and seeds. 
Plants make themselves; they repair injuries; they move water, 
nutrients, and photosynthate from cell to cell; they store sugars; 
they make tannin and other toxins and regulate their levels in 
defence against grazers; they make nectars and emit pheromones 
to influence the behaviour of pollinating insects and the responses 
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of other plants; they emit allelopathic agents to suppress invaders; 
they make thorns, trap insects. They can reject genetically incom-
patible grafts. 
A plant, like any other organism, sentient or not, is a sponta-
neous, self-maintaining system, sustaining and reproducing itself, 
executing its program, making a way through the world, checking 
against performance by means of responsive capacities with which 
to measure success. Something more than physical causes, even 
when less than sentience, is operating; there is information superin-
tending the causes; without it the organism would collapse into a 
sand heap. The information is used to preserve the plant identity. 
All this cargo is carried by the DNA, essentially a linguistic 
molecule. The genetic set is really a prepositional set—to choose a 
provocative term—recalling how the Latin propositum is an asser-
tion, a set task, a theme, a plan, a proposal, a project, as well as a 
cognitive statement. These molecules are set to drive the move-
ment from genotypic potential to phenotypic expression. Given a 
chance, these molecules seek organic self-expression. An organism, 
unlike an inert rock, claims the environment as source and sink, 
from which to abstract energy and materials and into which to 
excrete them. It 'takes advantage' of its environment. 
We pass to value when we recognize that the genetic set is a nor-
mative set; it distinguishes between what is and what ought to be.  
The organism is an axiological system, though not a moral system. 
So the tree grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds, and resists 
death. The physical state that the organism defends is a valued 
state. A life is defended for what it is in itself, without necessary 
further contributory reference. Every organism has a good-of-its- 
kind; it defends its own kind as a good kind. In this sense, the 
genome is a set of conservation molecules. 
Does not that mean that the plant is valuable (able to value) 
itself? If not, we will have to ask, as an open question: Well, the 
plant has a good of its own, but is there anything of value to it?1 
Possibly, even though plants have a good of their own, they are not 
able to value because they are not able to feel anything. Nothing 
matters to a plant. Hence, says Peter Singer, 'there is nothing to be 
taken into account' (Singer, 1976, p. 154). There is plant good, 
but not plant value. There is no valuer evaluating anything. Plants 
can do things that interest us, but the plants are not interested in 
what they are doing. They do not have any options among which 
they are choosing. They have only their merely functional goods. 
1 Robin Attfield remarks that 'even if trees have needs and a good of 
their own, they may still have no value of their own' (Attfield, 1981, p. 
35). 
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But, though things do not matter to plants, things matter for 
them. We ask, of a failing plant: What's the matter with that plant? 
If it is lacking sunshine and soil nutrients, and we arrange for 
these, we say: The tree is benefiting from the sunshine and the soil 
nutrients; and benefit is—everywhere else we encounter it—a value 
word. Can we ask, as an open question: The tree is benefiting from 
the sun and the nutrients, but are those valuable to it? That hardly 
seems coherent. 'This tree was injured when the elk rubbed its 
velvet off its antlers, and the tannin secreted there is killing the 
invading bacteria. But is this valuable to the tree?' Botanists say 
that the tree is irritable in the biological sense. 
Or if trees cannot be irritated, you no doubt think that bees can, 
even though you may not know what to think about bees as subject 
valuers. Objectively, it is difficult to dissociate the idea of value 
from natural selection. Biologists regularly speak of the 'survival 
value' of plant activities: thorns have survival value. Bees sting and 
do their waggle dance. These survival traits, though picked out by 
natural selection, are innate (= intrinsic) in the organism, that is, 
stored in its genes and expressed in structure and behaviour. 
But, it will be protested, careful philosophers will put this kind 
of 'value' in scare quotes. This is not really value at all, because 
there is no felt experience choosing from alternatives, no prefer-
ences being exercised. This so-called value is not a value, really, 
not one of interest to philosophers because it is not a value with 
interest in itself. Meanwhile we humans value many things about 
which we have no options (photosynthesis and protein), or even no 
knowledge (perhaps vitamin B1 or the cytochrome-c molecules). 
What are we to say of all these functional 'values'? Do they 
become of real value only upon their discovery, and even then 
have only instrumental value? 
Why is the organism not valuing what it is making resources 
of?—not consciously, but we do not want to presume that there is 
only conscious value or valuing. That is what we are debating, not 
assuming. A valuer is an entity able to defend value. Insentient 
organisms are the holders of value, although not the beholders of 
value. Some value is already present in nonsentient organisms, 
normative valuative systems, prior to the emergence of further 
dimensions of value with sentience. Otherwise we have to ask, as 
an open question: Well, the bee is making use of the nectar, but is 
the honey valuable to the bee? My mind is not subtle enough to 
use words with such precision. The bee's defending its own life for 
what it is in itself is just as much fact of the matter as is its using 
its stinger or making honey to do so. 
No, these are observations of value in nature with just as much 
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certainty as they are biological facts. We are misled to think that 
all the value of the tree, instrumental or intrinsic, must be subject-
ively conferred, like the greenness, a secondary quality, or even a 
tertiary one. A simpler, less anthropically based, more biocentric 
theory holds that some values, instrumental and intrinsic, are 
objectively there, discovered not generated by the valuer. Trees 
may not be coloured without a perceiver, but they exist per se; and 
only if their existence is dynamically defended. That is not an ana-
logue of colour at all. Trees do appear to be green, and perhaps we 
do not want to call the electromagnetic waves actually there 
'greenness'. Trees also photosynthesise with or without humans 
watching them. Even those who think that all the tree's intrinsic 
value has to be conferred by humans still think that matters can be 
better or worse for the tree, and this amounts to saying that the 
tree on its own has its goods and harms. Norton and Windelband, 
unable to forget their experiential omnipresence as valuers, have 
forgotten elementary biology. 
Some worry that we here commit the naturalistic fallacy. We 
find what biologically is in nature and conclude that something 
valuable is there, something which we may say we ought to protect. 
But does it not rather seem that the facts here are value facts, when 
we are describing what benefits the tree? Such value is pretty much 
fact of the matter. If we refuse to recognize such values being 
objectively there, have we committed some fallacy? Rather, the 
danger is the other way round. We commit the subjectivist fallacy if 
we think all values lie in subjective experience, and, worse still, the 
anthropocentrist fallacy if we think all values lie in human options 
and preferences. 
Valuable Species 
On our travels we may see endangered species. If so, we will value 
them. But are we seeing, and valuing, species? Or just that trum-
peter swan, this grizzly bear, that we were lucky enough to see? 
That is partly a scientific and partly a philosophical problem. I 
have seen, and valued, swans and bears in Yellowstone over four 
decades. But not the same individuals, rather bear replaced by 
bear replaced by bear, swan-swan-swan. 
Certainly humans are able to value species both by instrumental 
use and by conferring intrinsic value on them. But can a species be 
value-able all by itself, able to value at the species-level? A species 
has no self. There is no analogue to the nervous hookups or circula-
tory flows that characterize the organism. But now we must ask 
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whether singular somatic identity conserved is the only process that 
is valuable. A species is another level of biological identity reasserted 
genetically over time. Identity need not attach solely to the centred 
or modular organism; it can persist as a discrete pattern over time. 
The life that the organismic individual has is something pass- 
ing through the individual as much as something it intrinsically 
possesses. The genetic set, in which is coded the telos, is as evi-
dently the property of the species as of the individual through 
which it passes. Value is something dynamic to the specific form 
of life. The species is a bigger event than the individual with its 
interests or sentience. Events can be good for the well-being of 
the species, considered collectively, although they are harmful if 
considered as distributed to individuals. When a wolf is tearing 
up an elk, the individual elk is in distress, but Cervus canadensis 
is in no distress. The species is being improved, shown by the 
fact that wolves will subsequently find elk harder to catch. If the 
predators are removed, and the carrying capacity is exceeded, 
wildlife managers may have to benefit a species by culling its 
member individuals. 
Even the individuals that escape external demise die of old age; 
and their deaths, always to the disadvantage of individuals, are a 
necessity for the species. A finite life span makes room for those 
replacements that enable development, allowing the population to 
improve in fitness or to adapt to a shifting environment. The sur-
plus of young, with most born to perish prematurely, is disadvan-
tageous to such individuals, but advantageous to the species. 
Without the 'flawed' reproduction that incorporates mutation and 
permits variation, without selection of the more fit few, and death 
of the less fit, which harms most individuals, the species would 
soon be extinct in a changing environment. The individual is a 
receptacle of the form, and the receptacles are broken while the 
form survives, but the form cannot otherwise survive. 
Reproduction is typically assumed to be a need of individuals, 
but since any particular individual can flourish somatically with-
out reproducing at all, indeed may be put through duress and risk 
or spend much energy reproducing, by another logic we can inter-
pret reproduction as the species staying in place by its replace-
ments. In this sense a female grizzly does not bear cubs to be 
healthy herself. Rather, her cubs are Ursus arctos, threatened by 
nonbeing, recreating itself by continuous performance. A female 
animal does not have mammary glands nor a male testicles because 
the function of these is to preserve its own life; these organs are 
defending the line of life bigger than the somatic individual. The 
locus of the value that is defended over generations is as much in 
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the form of life, since the individuals are genetically impelled to 
sacrifice themselves in the interests of reproducing their kind. 
An insistent individualist can claim that species-level phenomena 
(vitality in a population, danger to a species, reproduction of a life 
form, tracking a changing environment) are only epiphenomena, 
byproducts of aggregated individuals in their interrelationships. 
But our more comprehensive account, interpreting the species itself 
as a kind of individual, historic lineage over time, is just as plausi-
ble. Biologists have often and understandably focused on individual 
organisms, and some recent trends interpret biological processes 
from the perspective of genes. But a consideration of species 
reminds us that many events can be interpreted at this level too. 
Properly understood, the story at the microscopic genetic level 
reflects the story at the ecosystemic specific level, with the individ-
ual a macroscopic mid-level between. The genome is a kind of map 
coding the species; the individual is an instance incarnating it. 
Much of what we earlier said about individual organisms as 
nonmoral normative systems can be resaid, mutatis mutandis, of 
species. The single, organismic-directed course is part of a bigger 
picture in which a species too runs a telic course through the envi-
ronment, using individuals resourcefully to maintain its course 
over much longer periods of time. The species line is the vital liv-
ing system, the whole, of which individual organisms are the 
essential parts. The species defends a particular form of life, pur-
suing a pathway through the world, resisting death (extinction), by 
regeneration maintaining a normative identity over time. It is as 
logical to say that the individual is the species' way of propagating 
itself as to say that the embryo or egg is the individual's way of 
propagating itself. The value resides in the dynamic form; the 
individual inherits this, exemplifies it, and passes it on. If so, what 
prevents value existing at that level? The appropriate survival unit 
is the appropriate location of valuing. 
Even a species is a kind of valuer. Species as historical lines have 
a defended biological identity, though they do not have any sub-
jective experience. Species are quite real; that there really is a 
bear-bear-bear sequence is about as certain as anything we believe 
about the empirical world. Species are lively and full of life, they 
are processes, they are wholes, they have a kind of unity and 
integrity. The species line too is value-able, able to conserve a bio-
logical identity. Indeed it is more real, more value-able than the 
individual, necessary though individuals are for the continuance of 
this lineage. 
We said earlier that natural selection picks out whatever traits an 
organism has that are valuable to it, relative to its survival. But if 
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we ask what is the essence of this value, it is not the somatic sur-
vival of the organismic individual; this value ability is the ability to 
reproduce. That locates value-ability innate or intrinsic within the 
organism, but it just as much locates the value-ability as the capacity 
to re-produce a next generation, and a next generation positioned 
to produce a next generation after that. Any biocentrism that 
focuses on individuals has got to argue away the fact that natural 
selection is rather careless with individuals; the test to which it puts 
them is whether they can pass on the historical lineage. 
Valuable Ecosystems 
Exploring, we will see different ecosystems: an oak-hickory forest, 
a tall grass prairie. At least we see trees and grasses. But do we see 
ecosystems? Maybe we immerse ourselves in them, for an ecosys-
tem is not so much an object in the focus of vision as an enveloping 
community, a place in space, a process in time, a set of vital rela-
tionships. This can mean that philosophers have difficulty seeing, 
and valuing, ecosystems. Yet, really, the ecosystem is the funda-
mental unit of development and survival. 
Humans can value whatever they wish in nature. This can 
include ecosystems. 'A thing is right,' concluded Aldo Leopold, 
'when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise' (Leopold, 
1966, p. 240). Leopold wanted a 'land ethic'. So humans can value 
ecosystem communities intrinsically—for what they are in them-
selves—as well as instrumentally. But can ecosystems be valuable 
all by themselves? 
Actually, there is a deeper worry again, partly scientific and partly 
philosophical. Perhaps ecosystems do not exist—or exist in too 
loose a way to be valuers. They are nothing but aggregations of 
their more real members, like a forest is (some say) nothing more 
than a collection of trees. Even a human will have trouble valuing 
what does not really exist. We can value collections, as of stamps, 
but this is just the aggregated value of individual stamps. Still, an 
ecosystem, if it exists, is rather different. Nothing in the stamp col-
lection is alive; the collection is neither self-generating nor self- 
maintaining. Neither stamp nor collection is valuable on its own. 
But perhaps ecosystems are both valuable to humans and, if they 
exist, value-able as systems in themselves. 
We need ecology to discover what biotic community means as an 
organisational mode. Then we can reflect philosophically to dis-
cover the values there. Ecosystems can seem little more than sto- 
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chastic processes. A sea-shore, a tundra, is a loose collection of 
externally related parts. Much of the environment is not organic at 
all (rain, groundwater, rocks, nonbiotic soil particles, air). Some is 
dead and decaying debris (fallen trees, scat, humus). These things 
have no organized needs; the collection of them is a jumble. The 
fortuitous interplay between organisms is simply a matter of the 
distribution and abundance of organisms, how they get dispersed, 
birth rates and death rates, population densities, moisture regimes, 
parasitism and predation, checks and balances. There is really not 
enough centred process to call community. 
An ecosystem has no brain, no genome, no skin, no self-identifi-
cation, no telos, no unified program. It does not defend itself 
against injury or death. It is not irritable. The parts (foxes, sedges) 
are more complex than the wholes (forests, grasslands). So it can 
begin to seem as if an ecosystem is too low a level of organisation 
to be the direct focus of concern. Ecosystems do not and cannot 
care; they have no interests about which they or we can care. 
But this is to misunderstand ecosystems, to make a category 
mistake. To fault communities as though they ought to be organis- 
mic individuals is to look at one level for what is appropriate at 
another. One should look for a matrix of interconnections between 
centres, for creative stimulus and open-ended potential. 
Everything will be connected to many other things, sometimes by 
obligate associations, more often by partial and pliable dependen-
cies; and, among other components, there will be no significant 
interactions. There will be shunts and criss-crossing pathways, 
cybernetic subsystems and feedback loops. One looks for selection 
pressures and adaptive fit, not for irritability or repair of injury, 
for speciation and life support, not for resisting death. We must 
think more systemically, and less organismically. 
An ecosystem generates a spontaneous order that envelops and 
produces the richness, beauty, integrity and dynamic stability of 
the component parts. Though these organized interdependences 
are loose in comparison with the tight connections within an 
organism, all these metabolisms are as vitally linked as are liver 
and heart. The equilibrating ecosystem is not merely push-pull 
forces. It is an equilibrating of values. 
We do not want in an undiscriminating way to extrapolate cri-
teria of value from organism to biotic community, any more than 
from person to animal or from animal to plant. Rather, we want to 
discriminate the criteria appropriate to this level. The selective 
forces in ecosystems at once transcend and produce the lives of 
individual plants and animals. Evolutionary ecosystems over geo-
logical time have increased the numbers of species on Earth from 
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zero to five million or more. R. H. Whittaker found that on conti-
nental scales and for most groups 'increase of species diversity . . . 
is a self-augmenting evolutionary process without any evident 
limit'. There is a tendency toward what he called 'species packing' 
(Whittaker, 1972, p. 214). 
Superimposed on this, the quality of individual lives in the 
upper trophic rungs of ecological pyramids has risen. One-celled 
organisms evolved into many-celled, highly integrated organisms. 
Photosynthesis evolved and came to support locomotion—swim-
ming, walking, running, flight. Stimulus-response mechanisms 
became complex instructive acts. Warm-blooded animals followed 
cold-blooded ones. Neural complexity, conditioned behaviour, 
and learning emerged. Sentience appeared—sight, smell, hearing, 
taste, pleasure, pain. Brains evolved, coupled with hands. 
Consciousness and self-consciousness arose. Persons appeared 
with intense concentrated unity. The products are valuable, able 
to be valued by these humans; but why not say that the process is 
what is really value-able, able to produce these values? 
Ecosystems are selective systems, as surely as organisms are 
selective systems. The system selects over the long ranges for indi-
viduality, for diversity, for adapted fitness, for quantity and quali-
ty of life. Organisms defend only their own selves or kinds, but the 
system spins a bigger story. Organisms defend their continuing 
survival; ecosystems promote new arrivals. Species increase their 
kinds, but ecosystems increase kinds, and increase the integration 
of kinds. The system is a kind of field with characteristics as vital 
for life as any property contained within particular organisms. The 
ecosystem is the depth source of individual and species alike. 
In the current debate among biologists about the levels at which 
selection takes place—individual organisms, populations, species, 
genes—the recent tendency to move selective pressures down to 
the genetic level forgets that a gene is always emplaced in an 
organism that is emplaced in an ecosystem. The molecular config-
urations of DNA are what they are because they record the story 
of a particular form of life in the macroscopic, historical ecosys-
tem. What is generated arises from molecular mutations, but what 
survives is selected for adaptive fit in an ecosystem. We cannot 
make sense of biomolecular life without understanding ecosys- 
temic life, the one level as vital as the other. 
Philosophers, sometimes encouraged by biologists, may think 
ecosystems are just epiphenomenal aggregations. This is a confu-
sion. Any level is real if there is significant downward causation. 
Thus the atom is real because that pattern shapes the behaviour of 
electrons; the cell because that pattern shapes the behaviour of 
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amino acids; the organism because that pattern co-ordinates the 
behaviour of hearts and lungs; the community because the niche 
shapes the morphology and behaviour of the foxes within it. Being 
real requires an organisation that shapes the existence and the 
behaviour of members or parts. 
Axiologically, in the more comprehensive levels, the terms 
'instrumental' and 'intrinsic' do not work very well. Ecosystems 
have 'systemic value'. But if we want to know what is value-able, 
able to create value, why not say that it is the productivity of such 
ecosystems, bringing into existence these phenomena that, when 
we arrive, the human consciousness is also able to value? What is 
incredible is not the existence of ecosystems. What is really incred-
ible is that we humans, arriving late on the evolutionary scene, 
ourselves products of it, bring all the value into the world, when 
and as we turn our attention to our sources. That claim has too 
much subjective bias. It values a late product of the system, psy-
chological life, and subordinates everything else to this. It mistakes 
a fruit for the whole plant, the last chapter for the whole story. 
All value does not end in either human or non-human intrinsic 
value, to which everything else is contributory. Values are intrin-
sic, instrumental, and systemic, and all three are interwoven, no 
one with priority over the others in significance, although systemic 
value is foundational. Each locus of intrinsic value gets folded into 
instrumental value by the system, and vice versa. There are no 
intrinsic values, nor instrumental ones either, without the encom-
passing systemic creativity. It would be foolish to value the golden 
eggs and disvalue the goose that lays them. It would be a mistake 
to value the goose only instrumentally. A goose that lays golden 
eggs is systemically valuable. How much more so is an ecosystem 
that generates myriads of species, or even, as we next see, an Earth 
that produces billions of species, ourselves included. 
Valuable Earth 
I promised to explore the whole world; so let's get the planet in 
focus. Viewing Earthrise, Edgar Mitchell, was entranced: 
"Suddenly from behind the rim of the moon, in long-slow motion 
moments of immense majesty, there emerges a sparkling blue and 
white jewel, a light, delicate sky-blue sphere laced with slowly 
swirling veils of white, rising gradually like a small pearl in a thick 
sea of black mystery. It takes more than a moment to fully realize 
this is Earth . . . home' (Kelley, 1988, at photographs 42-45). 
Michael Collins was Earthstruck: 'When I travelled to the moon, it 
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wasn't my proximity to that battered rockpile I remember so 
vividly, but rather what I saw when I looked back at my fragile 
home—a glistening, inviting beacon, delicate blue and white, a 
tiny outpost suspended in the black infinity. Earth is to be trea-
sured and nurtured, something precious that must endure' 
(Gallant, 1980, p. 6). 
Pearls are, a philosopher might object, valuable only when 
humans come around. But this mysterious Earth-pearl, a biologist 
will reply, is a home long before we humans come. This is the only 
biosphere, the only planet with an ecology. Earth may not be the 
only planet where anything, is valuable—able to be valued by 
humans intrinsically or instrumentally—but it is the only place 
able to produce vitality before humans come. The view from space 
symbolizes all this. 
Earlier the challenge was to evaluate persons, animals, plants, 
species, ecosystems; but environmental valuing is not over until 
we have risen to the planetary level. Earth is really the relevant 
survival unit. But valuing the whole Earth is unfamiliar and needs 
philosophical analysis. We may seem to be going to extremes. 
Earth is, after all, just earth. The belief that dirt could have intrin-
sic value is sometimes taken as a reductio ad absurdum in environ-
mental philosophy. Dirt is not the sort of thing that has value by 
itself. Put like that, we agree. An isolated clod defends no intrinsic 
value and it is difficult to say that it has much value in itself. But 
that is not the end of the matter, because a clod of dirt is integrated 
into an ecosystem; earth is a part, Earth the whole. Dirt is product 
and process in a systemic nature. We should try to get the global 
picture, and switch from a lump of dirt to the Earth system in 
which it has been created. 
Earth is, some will insist, a big rockpile like the moon, only one 
on which the rocks are watered and illuminated in such way that 
they support life. So maybe it is really the life we value and not the 
Earth, except as instrumental to life. We do not have duties to 
rocks, air, ocean, dirt, or Earth; we have duties to people, or living 
things. We must not confuse duties to the home with duties to the 
inhabitants. We do not praise so much the dirt as what is in the 
dirt, not earth so much as what is on Earth. But this is not a sys-
temic view of what is going on. We need some systematic account 
of the valuable Earth we now behold, before we beheld it, not just 
some value that is generated in the eye of the beholder. Finding 
that value will generate a global sense of obligation. 
The evolution of rocks into dirt into fauna and flora is one of the 
great surprises of natural history, one of the rarest events in the 
astronomical universe. Earth is all dirt, we humans too arise up 
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from the humus, and we find revealed what dirt can do when it is 
self-organizing under suitable conditions. This is pretty spectacu-
lar dirt. Really, the story is little short of a series of 'miracles', 
wondrous, fortuitous events, unfolding of potential; and when 
Earth's most complex product, Homo sapiens, becomes intelligent 
enough to reflect over this cosmic wonderland, everyone is left 
stuttering about the mixtures of accident and necessity out of 
which we have evolved. For some the black mystery will be numi-
nous and signal transcendence; for some the mystery may be 
impenetrable. Perhaps we do not have to have all the cosmological 
answers. Nobody has much doubt that this is a precious place, a 
pearl in a sea of black mystery. 
The elemental chemicals of life—carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, 
nitrogen—are common enough throughout the universe. They are 
made in the stars. But life, rare elsewhere, is common on Earth, 
and the explanation lies in the ordinary elements in an extraordi-
nary setting, the super-special circumstances in which these com-
mon chemicals find themselves arranged on Earth, that is, in the 
self-organizing system. On an everyday scale, earth, dirt, seems to 
be passive, inert, an unsuitable object of moral concern. But on a 
global scale? 
The scale changes nothing, a critic may protest, the changes are 
only quantitative. Earth is no doubt precious as life support, but it 
is not precious in itself. There is nobody there in a planet. There is 
not even the objective vitality of an organism, or the genetic trans-
mission of a species line. Earth is not even an ecosystem, strictly 
speaking; it is a loose collection of myriads of ecosystems. So we 
must be talking loosely, perhaps poetically or romantically, of 
valuing Earth. Earth is a mere thing, a big thing, a special thing 
for those who happen to live on it, but still a thing, and not appro-
priate as an object of intrinsic or systemic valuation. We can, if we 
insist on being anthropocentrists, say that it is all valueless except 
as our human resource. 
But we will not be valuing Earth objectively until we appreciate 
this marvellous natural history. This really is a superb planet, the 
most valuable entity of all, because it is the entity able to produce 
all the Earthbound values. At this scale of vision, if we ask what is 
principally to be valued, the value of life arising as a creative 
process on Earth seems a better description and a more compre-
hensive category. 
Perhaps you think that species are unreal. Perhaps you still 
insist that ecosystems are unreal, only aggregations, but how about 
Earth? Will you say that Earth too, being a higher level entity, is 
unreal? Only an aggregation, and not a systemic whole? There is 
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no such thing as a biosphere? Surely, Earth has some rather clear 
boundaries, does it not? Will you say that this is a planet where 
nothing matters? Nothing matters to Earth, perhaps, but every-
thing matters on Earth, for Earth. 
Do not humans sometimes value Earth's life-supporting systems 
because they are valuable, and not always the other way round? Is 
this value just a matter of late-coming human interests? Or is 
Earth not historically a remarkable, valuable place, a place able to 
produce value prior to the human arrival, and even now valuable 
antecedently to the human uses of it? It seems parochial to say that 
our part alone in the drama establishes all its worth, The produc-
tion of value over the millenia of natural history is not something 
subjective that goes on in the human mind. In that sense, a valu-
able Earth is not the reductio ad absurdum of valuing dirt. It is not 
even locating the most valuable thing in the world; it is locating 
the ultimate value of the world itself. The creativity within the 
natural system we inherit, and the values this generates, are the 
ground of our being, not just the ground under our feet. Earth 
could be the ultimate object of duty, short of God, if God exists. 
Valuable Nature 
William James, toward the beginning of our century, starkly por-
trayed the utterly valueless world, transfigured as a gift of the 
human coming: 
Conceive yourself, if possible, suddenly stripped of all the emo-
tion with which your world now inspires you, and try to imagine 
it as it exists, purely by itself, without your favorable or unfavor-
able, hopeful or apprehensive comment. It will be almost 
impossible for you to realize such a condition of negativity and 
deadness. No one portion of the universe would then have 
importance beyond another; and the whole collection of its 
things and series of its events would be without significance, 
character, expression, or perspective. Whatever of value, inter-
est, or meaning our respective worlds may appear endued with 
are thus pure gifts of the spectator's mind. (James, 1925, p. 150) 
At the end of this century, this is not what the astronauts think at 
all. They do not see Earth as negativity and deadness, nor do they 
think that this portion of the universe has no significance beyond 
any other part, except by gift of our spectating minds. They did 
not say that the world was valuable only because they took along 
an indubitable self into space and projected value onto Earth. 
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They rather see that human life arises in a spectacular place, in a 
nature of whose creative patterns they are part. 
According to the old paradigm, so long dominant that to some it 
now seems elementary, there is no value without an experiencing 
valuer, just as there are no thoughts without a thinker, no percepts 
without a perceiver, no deeds without a doer, no targets without an 
aimer. Valuing is felt preferring by human choosers. Possibly, 
extending this paradigm, sentient animals may also value. But 
plants cannot value; they have no options and make no choices. A 
fortiori, Earth and nature cannot be bona fide valuers. One can 
always hang on to the claim that value, like a tickle or remorse, 
must be felt to be there. Its esse is percipi. Nonsensed value is non-
sense. It is only beings with 'insides' to them that have value. 
But the problem with the 'no value without a valuer' axiom is 
that it is too individualistic; it looks for some centre of value locat-
ed in a subjective self. And we nowhere wish to deny that such val-
uers are sufficient for value. But that is not the whole account of 
value in a more holistic, systemic, ecological, global account. 
Perhaps there can be no doing science without a scientist, no reli-
gion without a believer, no tickle without somebody tickled. But 
there can be law without a lawgiver, history without a historian; 
there is biology without biologists, physics without physicists, cre-
ativity without creators, story without story-tellers, achievement 
without achievers—and value without valuers. A sentient valuer is 
not necessary for value. Another way is for there to be a value-gen-
erating system able to generate value. If you like, that is another 
meaning of value-er; any x is a valuer if x is value-able, able to 
produce values. 
It is true that humans are the only evaluators who can reflect 
about what is going on at this global scale, who can deliberate 
about what they ought to do conserving it. When humans do this, 
they must set up the scales; and humans are the measurers of 
things. Animals, organisms, species, ecosystems, Earth, cannot 
teach us how to do this evaluating. But they can display what it is 
that is to be valued. The axiological scales we construct do not 
constitute the value, any more than the scientific scales we erect 
create what we thereby measure. 
Humans are not so much lighting up value in a merely poten-
tially valuable world, as they are psychologically joining ongoing 
planetary natural history in which there is value wherever there is 
positive creativity. While such creativity can be present in subjects 
with their interests and preferences, it can also be present objec-
tively in living organisms with their lives defended, and in species 
that defend an identity over time, and in systems that are self- 
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organizing and that project storied achievements. The valuing 
subject in an otherwise valueless world is an insufficient premise 
for the experienced conclusions of those who value natural history. 
Conversion to a biological and geological view seems truer to 
world experience and more logically compelling. This too is a per-
spective, but ecologically better informed; we know our place on a 
home planet. From this more objective viewpoint, there is some-
thing subjective, something philosophically naive, and even some-
thing hazardous in a time of ecological crisis, about living in a ref-
erence frame where one species takes itself as absolute and values 
everything else in nature relative to its potential to produce value 
for itself. Such philosophers live in an unexamined world, and, in 
result, they and those they guide live unworthy lives, because they 
cannot see their valuable world. 
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